Linggo, Marso 5, 2017

how important is gold? STORY OF WORLD ECONOMY















what produced the world depression of 1929, why was it so widespread, so deep, so long? 

1929 depression was so wide, so deep and so long because the international economic system was rendered unstable by British inability and United States unwillingness to assume responsibility for stabilizing it particulars: maintaining a relatively open market for distress goods;
-cyclical long-term lending; 
the overproduction of certain primary products such as wheat;
The world economic system was unstable unless some country stabilized it, as Britain had done in the nineteenth century and up to 1913. In 1929, the British couldn't and the United States wouldn't. When every country turned to protect its national private interest, the world public interest went down the drain, 
if the world economy behaved symmetrically, there could be no world depression
 A decline in the price of wheat might produce losses for farmers; it would, however, lead to gains in real purchasing power for consumers 
In the 1920s, United States foreign lending was positively correlated with domestic investment, not counterpoised. . The boom of the 1920s was accompani-d by foreign lending; the depression of the 193Os saw the capital flow reversed



















The cut in lending actually preceded the stock-market crash as investors were diverted from the boom in foreign bonds which followed the Dawes loan to the boom in domestic stocks dating from the spring of 1928.
he Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. At the first hint of trouble in agriculture, Hoover reached for the Republican household remedy

 Britain was willing to forego reparations, to the extent that war debts were written off -an attitude of limited self-denial- but the suggestion that the French could write off reparations, after having paid them in 1871 and 1819, and after four years of cruel war,
 the United States undertook a leading world role under Charles E. Hughes as early as the Disarmament Conference of 1922



America's Role in the World Economy,prescribed for the United States policies of maintenance of full employment at home and cooperation with international efforts at freer trade, restoring capital movements, improvement of the world monetary system and so on.


institutions and policies of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Group ofTen, Bank for International Settlements, International Monetary Fund, International Bank, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, etc. As an acquaintance on the International Monetary Fund staff put it



 Role of the small countries and France
say, converting sterling into gold in the summer of 1931, or raising tariffs with alacrity after 1930. There is, however, no universally accepted standard of behaviour for small countries

France sought power in its national interest, without adequately taking into account the repercussions of its positions on world economic or political stability.






 The French Gold Sink and the Great Deflation of 1929–32
 the link between the gold standard and the Great Depression is widely accepted, it begs the question of how the international monetary system produced such a monumental economic catastrophe. Structural flaws in the post–World War I gold standard and the fragility of international financial stability

  France was doing  accumulating gold reserves while failing to monetize them
France’s impact on the international monetary system is often believed to have been much smaller than that of the United States

“the French gold imports certainly aggravated the pressure of deflation in the rest of the world,”

Banque de France placed downward pressure on global money supplies.... U.S. and French gold policies must therefore share the blame for exacerbating the monetary aspects of the Great Depression.”

French monetary EXPERTS concluded that France deserves more blame than the United States for increasing the world’s monetary stringency in the late 1920s and early 1930s.

 while the United States did  to hinder the decline in world prices, especially after 1928, French policy can be charged with directly causing it.” “

“That French gold policy aggravated the international monetary contraction from 1928 to 1932 is beyond dispute,”

the United States and France held excess gold, compared to 1928, equivalent to 5 percent of the world’s gold reserves in 1929, 9 percent in 1930, and nearly 13 percent in 1931, when the gold standard began to fall apart. The United States and France contributed in almost equal proportions— about 60 percent to 40 percent—to the effective reduction in the world gold stock during those years.

THE GOLD STANDARD AND FEARS OF DEFLATION

 During World War I, most major countries abandoned the gold standard in order to use fiat currency to fund the war effort. As a result, those nations experienced high rates of inflation.

  The desire to bring inflation under control and restore monetary stability led most countries to plan on returning to the gold standard at some point after the war.

Under the gold standard, the price level for goods and services was determined by the supply and demand for gold. The change in the price level was determined by the difference between the growth in the supply and the demand for gold: prices would rise if the world gold supply increased more rapidly than the demand for gold, whereas prices would fall if the demand for gold grew faster than the supply of gold.

  Although ending inflation was a key motivation for returning to the gold standard, some leading economists of the day expressed the fear that a return to the gold standard could cause deflation

Banking crisis

The banking crises of the Great Depression, like many of their predecessors, originated with a boom–bust macroeconomic cycle. This was particularly true in the United States, where the Roaring Twenties was followed by the Great Depression. As the bust took hold, a contagion of fear led to large-scale short-term capital movements and currency and banking crises in many countries

Responding to crisis during the Great Depression was difficult because of the absence of institutions with an explicit mandate to maintain financial stability. Regulation and supervision, where it existed, was not especially effective. Deposit insurance systems did not exist

t trade collapse seems to be due to uncertainty and small trade costs changes interacting with supply chains. During the Depression, income losses, tariffs




Biyernes, Marso 3, 2017

US POLICIES ON THE PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE




US POLICIES ON 
THE PHILIPPINE INDEPENDENCE





PHILIPPINE GOVERNOR GENERAL HOWARD TAFT
During his time in the Philippines Taft followed a number of what he believed to be pragmatic short-term policies to bring about Filipino support for U.S. rule and end the ongoing resistance from Filipino independence activists- this policy is often termed the “policy of attraction”. This policy involved three key themes. Firstly, Taft would encourage limited Filipino participation in government, mostly at lower provincial levels and later, and more controversially, including three Filipinos on the U.S. controlled governing Commission. Second, Taft saw to it that advocacy of independence was legally hampered with short-term sedition laws stunting the ability of any pro-independence movement. And finally, Taft showed significant bias in political support and patronage of the Filipino Federal Party, a party that opposed independence and even initially supported statehood


Taft was called before a Senate investigative committee headed by Massachusetts pro-imperial senator, Henry Cabot Lodge. The committee was set up primarily to investigate allegations of war crimes in the Philippine-American conflict. However, in his testimony before the Senate 

 Taft also gave a fairly full picture of his ideas on what the future would hold for the anomalous relationship between the Philippine Islands and the United States. Firstly, Taft stated, a government had to be established under American guidance, ‘under which the Filipinos shall gradually improve their knowledge of what is individual liberty and what is a constitutional government, and subsequently the time will come when the United States and the Filipino people together can agree upon what their relations shall be.’

Taft genuinely thought the Philippines might one day become a state of the union, which was in the platform of his favoured Federal Party, or whether he simply left this matter unresolved so as to allow the Federal Party not to look foolish, is difficult to ascertain. What seems likely is that Taft, more than anything else, was keen to keep the end deliberately unclear, and therefore what one must then understand is why Taft would choose to do this. By leaving the ultimate fate of the islands unclear Taft aimed to: dampen hopes for a definite date for independence, strengthen the hopes of the minority who sought eventual statehood

After Taft left the Philippines at the end of 1903 to become Roosevelt’s new Secretary of War he maintained close ties to Philippine policy as the Bureau of Insular Affairs, which dealt with the administration of the Philippines, was within the Department of War. Although no longer directly in control of Philippine affairs on a day-to-day basis, the new Secretary of War stuck to his previous line of thought, telling the World Magazine in 1904 that: ‘THE GREAT MISTAKE THAT COULD BE MADE AT THIS TIME WOULD BE TO GIVE THE FILIPINOS THEIR INDEPENDENCE, OR EVEN TO MENTION A TIME WHEN WE ARE LIKELY TO GIVE THEM THEIR INDEPENDENCE. I DON’T HESITATE TO SAY THAT TO HINT THAT WITHIN SO MANY YEARS OR AT THE END OF SUCH-ANDSUCH A PERIOD THEY WOULD BECOME INDEPENDENT, WOULD BE A TERRIBLE MISTAKE,’


Roosevelt wrote Taft that he wished ‘our people were prepared permanently…to assume the control of the Philippine Islands for the good of the Filipinos…[but] I gravely question whether this is the case….’9 If this were not enough evidence that Roosevelt was starting to have second thoughts, he continued, ‘I think we shall have to be prepared for giving the islands independence of a more or less complete type much sooner than I think advisable.’10 However, regardless of Roosevelt’s impending sense that independence was an issue that was almost inevitably approaching sooner rather than later, Taft continued to speak for retention of the islands throughout the following years when he rose to the presidency as Roosevelt’s heir. 

U S Democrats were closely linked to the policy of Philippine independence, which had been associated with their party platform since annexation of the islands over a decade before. The most important piece of proposed legislation during this period was the Jones Bill, which aimed to provide a guarantee of independence, and in it earliest forms a date for independence within the coming decade. From this time onwards Taft became the most high-profile spokesperson of what became seen as a “retentionist” campaign against Democratic Party plans for such a promise of independence. 
Taft’s policy towards Philippine independence is its consistency in the face of adversity

Colonial Rule, Property Rights and Economic   Development in the Philippines

1912  Republican platform, “We accepted the responsibility of the Islands as a duty to civilization and the Filipino people

 The UNITED STATES OF AMERICAcould not therefore abandon the Philippines at an acceptable political cost unless they could demonstrate that a stable self‐sufficient government had in fact been

The U.S. implemented several land reforms during its occupation of the Philippines. Using data from the censuses of 1903 and 1918, we consider the im‐ pact of two important changes: the redistribution of the friar lands formerly be‐ longing to the Catholic Church, and the implementation of a formal land titling program. We find that the land reforms had the unintended consequence of in‐ creasing the incidence of squatting; however, the friar lands program was suc‐ cessful in reducing land inequality. In addition, we also investigate the impact of these reforms on the doubling of Philippine rice productivity and the decision to switch to commercial crops between 1903 and 1918. 

U.S. colonial rule in the Philippines as a test case of the hypothesis that ex‐ ternally‐imposed institutional reforms are extremely difficult to implement.  Specifi‐ cally, we examine the impact of two major reforms to property rights undertaken by the American colonial administrators. The first was the purchase of the “friar lands” from the Catholic Church and their subsequent redistribution to Filipino peasants.   The sec‐ ond is the implementation the Torrens system of land registration throughout the Phil‐ ippines. The Torrens system involved conducting detailed cadastral surveys and issu‐ ing formal written titles to the landholders. We should note that several developing countries have undertaken large‐scale land titling programs in  years,

The U.S. made very large and prolonged efforts to reform Philippine property rights institutions.  The political economy of the American occupation gave the U.S. admini‐ stration two reasons to follow through on the reforms.  First, widespread anti‐imperial sentiment in the U.S. required Washington to show tangible signs of progress (albeit at minimal cost to the American taxpayer) in order to retain domestic support.  Republi‐ cans put considerable effort into implementing the “policy of attraction.” 4  The policy of attraction involved reforms of property rights, law enforcement, taxation, public educa‐ tion, and infrastructure designed to demonstrate that U.S. rule benefited the Filipinos.

the United States routinely kept a squadron of vessels in the western Pacific.  War plans drawn up in 1897 called for the Asiatic Squadron





The U.S.’s main interest in the Philippines was the retention of Manila or Subic Bay as a base for the Asiatic Squadron.  President McKinley initially intended only to take a sovereign base


PHILIPPINE ECONOMY
The U.S. eliminated most tariffs on Philippine products in 1909, and brought the is‐ lands fully within the country’s tariff wall.  As a result, the amount of land devoted to cash crop production grew faster than the amount of land devoted to rice.  (See Table 5.)    In 1903 more than half of the cultivated land in the Philippines grew rice, but this frac‐ tion declined to around 40% by 1918.  Note, however, that the large increase in culti‐ vated area (see Table 1) means that the absolute area devoted to rice still increased over this time period.  The other major crops during this period were corn, hemp and sugar‐ cane. The decline in the share of area devoted to rice was matched by a corresponding increase in the proportional area devoted to corn and sugar, while the area devoted to hemp declined.







Rice yields al‐ most doubled from 13 kilograms per hectare (kg/h) to 24 kg/h over this period.   in 1903, irrigation, formal credit, and the growth in cultivated land.   Puzzlingly, titling variables appear to have very little to do with the increase in rice production. 

under  the United States  Philippine exports increased to abnormal levels. Buoyed by record exports ---which led to growth in the domestic economy and consequently, public revenues (from internal sources and customs)--- the Philippine national government led by American Governor General Francis Burton Harrison (1913-1920) and in cooperation with top Filipino leaders undertook an economic development program that was anchored on massive public investment. Conversely, the economy and by extension, public revenues, floundered after the end of World War I in November 1918 as exports to the United States spiraled downwards due to post-war American policy of “economic normalcy”


Harrison’s replacement from the rival Republican Party, former US Army chief Major General Leonard Wood, in 1921 had as his administrative priority the undoing of Harrison’s economic development program beginning with the sale of public corporations either acquired or created during Harrison’s administration. Wood’s “reform” agenda was a result of his personal neo-liberal ideals and his political party’s conservative administrative agenda in the Philippines. The reversal in policy was vehemently opposed by influential Filipino leaders in government for political and economic reasons. Politically, the Filipino politicians hinged part of their campaign for Philippine independence on the success of the said economic development program in compliance with the American-imposed “stable government” requirement for self-rule. These leaders also believed that the adverse economic conditions prevailing in 1921 was just temporary, and that recovery was inevitable; thus, there was no need to abandon the economic development agenda forged during Harrison’s administration.

The colossal conflict between Governor Wood and Filipino leaders reached its climax in 1923 when all the Filipino members of Wood’s cabinet resigned their positions in protest of the chief executive’s perceived obstinacy. In the end, Wood viewed his role as Governor General not as caretaker of a Philippine state that would eventually be independent in the foreseeable future (as Harrison had), rather as an administrator whose main function was to provide stable leadership during the country’s recovery from a crisis situation through his stewardship of a conservative, neo-liberal economic agenda. The Filipino leaders were critical of Wood for failing to grasp what they thought was the true nature of the governorship: a temporary custodian who should not get in the way of Philippine independence, including its foundational economic development agenda the infallibility of which was only temporarily side-tracked, and not truly discredited

Ninety percent of total Philippine exports in 1917 came from four products: abaca or Manila hemp (49 percent of the total); coconut oil (21 percent); sugar (13 percent) and tobacco (7 percent). Manila hemp was, on average, sold about 80 pesos higher per 1,000 kilos in the United States market in 1917 (Annual Report of the Governor General of the Philippine Islands, 





Huwebes, Marso 2, 2017

STORY OF BALANGIGA





On Aug 11, 1901, Company C, 9th US Infantry Regiment, arrived in Balangiga on the southern coast of Samar island, to close its port and prevent supplies reaching Filipino guerillas in the interior


Us troops patrol on the coast of samar

A glamour unit, Company C was assigned provost duty and guarded the captured President Emilio Aguinaldo upon their return to the Philippines on June 5, 1901, after fighting Boxer rebels and helping capture Peking in China.

"The first month of Company C’s presence in Balangiga was marked by extensive fraternization between the Americans and the local residents. The friendly activities included tuba (native wine) drinking among the soldiers and native males, baseball games and arnis (stick fighting) demonstrations in the town plaza, and even a romantic link between an American sergeant,  Frank Betron, and a native woman church leader, Casiana “Geronima” Nacionales



"Tensions rose when on September 22, at a tuba store, two drunken American soldiers tried to molest the girl tending the store. The girl was rescued by her two brothers, who mauled the soldiers. In retaliation, the Company Commander, Capt. Thomas W. Connell,  West Point class of 1894, rounded up 143 male residents for forced labor to clean up the town in preparation for an official visit by his superior officers. They were detained overnight without food under two conical Sibley tents in the town plaza, each of which could only accommodate 16 persons; 78 of the detainees remained the next morning, after 65 others were released due to age and physical infirmity. Finally, Connell ordered the confiscation from their houses of all sharp bolos, and the confiscation and destruction of stored rice. Feeling aggrieved, the townspeople plotted to attack the U.S. Army garrison.


Valeriano Abanador, the mastermind





The mastermind was Valeriano Abanador (LEFT, IN OLD AGE), a Letran dropout and the local chief of police; he was assisted by five locals and two guerilla officers under the command of Brig. Gen. Vicente Lukban: Capt. Eugenio Daza and Sgt. Pedro Duran, Sr.  The lone woman plotter was Casiana “Geronima” 


Nacionales. Lukban played no role in the planning of the attack; he only learned about it a week later. About  500 men in seven attack units would take part. They represented virtually all families of Balangiga, whose outlying villages then included the present towns of Lawaan and Giporlos, and of Quinapundan, a town served by the priest in Balangiga.

"At 6:45 a.m., on Saturday, September 28, Abanador grabbed Pvt.  Adolph Gamlin's rifle from behind and hit him unconscious with its butt.  Abanador turned the rifle at the men in the sergeant’s mess tent, wounding one. He then waved a rattan cane above his head, and yelled: “Atake, mga Balangigan-on! (Attack, men of Balangiga!). A bell in the church tower was rung seconds later, to announce that the attack had begun.

"Balangiga Massacre;" Filipinos Attack American Soldiers, U.S. Army Retaliates
US COMPANY C IN BALANGIGA

"The guards outside the convent and municipal hall were killed. The Filipinos apparently sealed in the Sibley tents at the front of the municipal hall, having had weapons smuggled to them in water carriers, broke free and entered the municipal hall and made their way to the second floor. The men in the church broke into the convent through a connecting corridor and killed the officers who were billeted there. The mess tent and the two barracks were attacked. Most of the Americans were hacked to death before they could grab their firearms. The few who escaped the main attack fought with kitchen utensils, steak knives, and chairs.

"The convent was successfully occupied and so, initially, was the municipal hall, but the mess tent and barracks attack suffered a fatal flaw - about one hundred men were split into three groups, one of each target but too few attackers had been assigned to ensure success. A number of Co. C. personnel escaped from the mess tent and the barracks and were able to retake the municipal hall, arm themselves and fight back. Adolph Gamlin recovered consciousness, found a rifle and caused considerable casualties among the Filipinos. [Gamlin died at age 92 in the U.S. in 1969].

"Faced with immensely superior firepower and a rapidly degrading attack, Abanador ordered a retreat. But with insufficient numbers and fear that the rebels would re-group and attack again, the surviving Americans, led by Sgt.  Frank Betron, escaped by baroto(native canoes with outriggers, navigated by using wooden paddles) to Basey, Samar, about 20 miles away. The townspeople returned to bury their dead, then abandoned the town."
Of the original 74 man contingent, 48 died and 26 survived, 22 of them severely wounded. The dead included all of  Company C's commissioned officers: Capt. Thomas W. Connell (RIGHT), 1st Lt. Edward A. Bumpus, and Maj. Richard S. Griswold (the Company surgeon). The guerillas also took 100 rifles with 25,000 rounds of ammunition; 28 Filipinos died and 22 were wounded

On September 27, Friday, the natives sought divine help and intervention for the success of their plot through an afternoon procession and marathon evening novena prayers to their protector saints inside the church. They also ensured the safety of the women and children by having them leave the town after midnight, hours before the attack. Pvt. Adolph Gamlin observed women and children evacuating the town and reported it, but he was ignored.

Miyerkules, Marso 1, 2017

KATIPUNAN ROUGH RIDERS CLASH


KATIPUNAN AND THE  ROUGH RIDERS CLASH



Facing the prospect of defeat to a Great Power or to an upstart Filipino military, the Spanish proposed surrender terms to the United States that involved a mock battle for Manila, and the exclusion of Filipino insurgents. A staged battle would cause harm to few soldiers while enabling the Spanish to maintain a higher sense of national honor. After agreeing with the Americans to such conditions, the Spaniards raised the white flag to the U.S. “conquerors.”
American military units obliged by charging the city as the Filipinos watched helplessly. On August 14 in the church of San Augustine, the Spanish formally yielded control of Manila to the Americans.
  
========



Blocked from entering the city, Aguinaldo and his followers rendezvoused in a monastery north of Manila to establish a sovereign government, independent of the United States. It was there that Aguinaldo wrote, “The people struggle for their independence, absolutely convinced that the time has come when they can and should govern themselves.”

THE UNITED STATES MANIFEST OF DESTINY
    America’s war with Spain exploded within a larger wave of European and Japanese global expansion, sometimes called the “new imperialism.” What became a rush for territorial acquisition sprang from many different motivations, ranging from economic, missionary, and moral imperatives to a policy of pure “realpolitik”—a raw, competitive drive for national power and prestige

    For the United States, this Great Power race for empire coincided with Spanish mismanagement of colonial Cuba, an island only 90 miles from the U.S. shores

President William McKinley sent the battleship U.S.S. Maine into Havana Harbor, ostensibly to protect U.S. citizens. In an atmosphere of heightened tension, the Maine mysteriously blew up, and American newspapers fanned the angry reaction at home, accusing Spain of treachery. 

Domestic pressure, therefore, contributed to McKinley’s declaration of war on Spain in April. American victory after only four months left the United States in control of the former Spanish colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico in the Caribbean and Guam and the Philippines in the Pacific.

1898 was a major turning point in Philippines history. From the time    Ferdinand Magellan landed on Cebu on 16 March 1521 and claimed the archipelago for Spain. In 1542 the islandchain was named Islas Filipinas in honor of Prince Felipe (later Philip II) of Spain. The first permanent Spanish settlement was a fort and church on Cebu in 1565

While over a thousand islands were inhabited, the capital of Manila increasingly dominated culture and commerce in the course of the next 350 years. Sugar, hemp, and tobacco left Manila Harbor to the markets of China and beyond BUT  Few islanders benefited from the Spanish shipping trade. Filipino men built the ships and served as sailors, but the pay was poor.

Finally, in the late 19th century, a new group of Filipino activists began to emerge following an 1872 incident. Filipino workers and troops at the Cavite arsenal mutinied against the Spanish for better pay and work conditions. While the uprising was quickly squelched, three local priests who sought equality with Spanish priests were arrested and then executed near Manila Bay. They became the first modern martyrs in the Filipino movement for national independence.


The Filipino Revolution, therefore, began in 1896 when, under the flag of the Katipunan, or “Society of the Sons of the People,” some 20,000 Filipinos staged an uprising against their Spanish overlords. 

 Emilio Aguinaldo, the son of a wealthy aristocrat, rose quickly to the top of the revolutionary movement, and became president of the Katipunan in the spring of 1897. “Filipino citizens!” he declared. “Let us follow the example of European and American nations. Let us march under the Flag of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity!” With 200,000 Spanish troops tied down in Cuba, Madrid could ill afford a war in the Philippines. 

Filipino nationalists were ecstatic. Led by General Aguinaldo, and, following years of fighting for independence, they hoped for the honor of liberating Manila and declaring the birth of their sovereign nation. Meanwhile, Dewey—now promoted to rear admiral—waited in Manila for the U.S. Army to arrive. Intent on securing support from Filipino fighters, he sent a ship to Hong Kong to retrieve Aguinaldo. Dewey welcomed the revolutionary leader as a co-equal.

While Aguinaldo wrestled with the fate of the movement he led, United States-Spanish peace talks began in Paris on October 1, 1898. No Filipinos or Cubans attended the deliberations, nor were any invited. McKinley clearly wanted Cuba from the Spanish, but he was not yet sure about the Philippines. Ultimately, he decided that he needed the port of Manila in the Philippines in order to have a naval base in the Western Pacific. After considerable debate and reflection, McKinley also recommended annexing the Philippines rather than giving the Filipinos outright independence. Undeterred by American actions in Paris and the White House, as well as the upcoming treaty debate in the United States Senate, the Filipinos approved a constitution in January 1899 based on the republican representative principles embodied in the United States Constitution.

The 1898 election kept the Republicans in control of Congress. Five days later, President McKinley’s cabled his terms to U.S. treaty negotiators in Paris. Secretary of State John Hay then sent a follow up wire to the representatives: “Insist upon the cession of the whole of the Philippines. If necessary, pay to Spain twenty million dollars.” Spain accepted the amended terms and relinquished the Philippines, Cuba, Guam, and Puerto Rico. The 400-year-old, global Spanish Empire had now vanished. But had the United States also become the “New Spanish Empire” with the transfer of territories

And finally  The United States had officially acquired its first colony - the Philippines
=================================

McKinley’s decision and the Senate’s action, the U.S. Army battled Filipino nationalist insurgents for four years, from 1898 to 1902.

In early 1899, as Rear Admiral Dewey doubled his order of ammunition to deal with the Filipino insurrection
=============================
THE FILIPINO AMERICAN WAR
“About eight o’clock, Miller and I were cautiously pacing our district. We came to a fence and were trying to see what the Filipinos were up to. Suddenly, near at hand, on our left, was a low but unmistakable Filipino outpost signal whistle. It was immediately answered by a similar whistle about twenty-five yards to the right. Then a red lantern flashed a signal from blockhouse number seven. We have never seen such a sign used before. In a moment, something rose up slowly in front of us. It was a Filipino. I yelled, “Halt!” and made it pretty loud, for I was accustomed to challenging the officer of the guard in approved military style. I challenged him with another loud “Halt!” Then he shouted “Halto!” to me. Well, I thought the best thing to do was to shoot him. He dropped. If I didn’t kill him, I guess he died of fright. Two Filipinos sprang out of the gateway about fifteen feet from us. I called, “Halt!” and Miller fired and dropped one. I saw that another was left. Well, I think I got my second Filipino that time.”









Battle of Zapote River 

The battle started around 6:15am after three shots were fired by the Filipinos to the American outpost from a 1-pounder Hotchkiss gun. In retaliation, the Sixth artillery under Lieutenant Benjamin M. Koehler fired back six shrapnels from two 3.2-inch (81 mm) guns

FIRST PHILIPPINE COMMISSION



On February 4, Aguinaldo declared "That peace and friendly relations with the Americans be broken and that the latter be treated as enemies, within the limits prescribed by the laws of war. On June 2, 1899, the Malolos Congress enacted and ratified a declaration of war on the United States, which was publicly proclaimed on that same day by Pedro Paterno, President of the Assembly.

An attack on the United States forces was planned which should annihilate the little army in Manila, and delegations were appointed to secure the interference of foreign powers. The protecting cloak of pretense of friendliness to the United States was to be kept up until the last. While commissioners were appointed to negotiate with General Otis, secret societies were organized in Manila pledged to obey orders of the most barbarous character to kill and burn. The attack from without and the attack from within was to be on a set day and hour. The strained situation could not last. The spark was applied, either inadvertently or by design, on the 4th of February by an insurgent, willfully transgressing upon what, by their own admission, was within the agreed limits of the holding of the American troops. Hostilities resulted and the war was an accomplished fact


"On the night of February 2 they sent in a strong detachment to draw the fire of our outposts, which took up a position immediately in front and within a few yards of the same. The outpost was strengthened by a few of our men, who silently bore their taunts and abuse the entire night. This was reported to me by General MacArthur, whom I directed to communicate with the officer in command of the insurgent troops concerned. His prepared letter was shown me and approved, and the reply received was all that could be desired. However, the agreement was ignored by the insurgents and on the evening of February 4 another demonstration was made on one of our small outposts, which occupied a retired position at least 150 yards within the line which had been mutually agreed upon, an insurgent approaching the picket and refusing to halt or answer when challenged. The result was that our picket discharged his piece, when the insurgent troops near Santa Mesa opened a spirited fire on our troops there stationed.



The insurgents had thus succeeded in drawing the fire of a small outpost, which they had evidently labored with all their ingenuity to accomplish, in order to justify in some way their premeditated attack. It is not believed that the chief insurgent leaders wished to open hostilities at this time, as they were not completely prepared to assume the initiative. They desired two or three days more to perfect their arrangements, but the zeal of their army brought on the crisis which anticipated their premeditated action. They could not have delayed long, however, for it was their object to force an issue before American troops, then en route, could arrive in Manila."


By January 10, insurgents were ready to assume the offensive, but desired, if possible, to provoke the Americans into firing the first shot. They made no secret of their desire for conflict, but increased their hostile demonstrations and pushed their lines forward into forbidden territory. Their attitude is well illustrated by the following extract from a telegram sent by Colonel Cailles to Aguinaldo on January 10, 1899

BATTLE OF MANILA FEB 5, 1899


us troops positioned against katipuneros









1st colorado company of the US Army reinforcement



1st colorado Us troops occupied Malate against Katipuneros








minesota company of the US troops 
================================
By late summer 1899, when stepped-up American troop reinforcements faced Aguinaldo’s equally serious pledge to wage guerrilla-style war, the price tag for empire-building shot up. Casualty figures in the Philippines also worried President McKinley. Three thousand Americans and 15,000 Filipinos had been killed

South of Manila, in the province of Batangas, the Americans assembled all non-insurgents into military zones of protection. The similarities to Spanish methods in Cuba were unmistakable, as anyone found outside of these zones was assumed to be hostile, and were killed or imprisoned. 

In April 1902, following more than three years of warfare, Filipino leaders conceded defeat to the United States. For their part, the exhausted Americans had lost most of the zeal that had led to late nineteenth-century imperialism. Even President Roosevelt, once a champion of U.S. empire-building, admitted that his nation was ill-suited for imperialism. On reflection, he opined that the Philippines had become America’s Achilles heel. While the United States would use military force, time and again, across Latin America, and in portions of Asia, the Pacific, and elsewhere,